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Complex modern applications have to be developed to be de-
pendable to meet their requirements and the expectations
of their users. An important part of this is their ability
to deal with various threats (such as faults in the system
environment, operator’s mistakes, underlying hardware and
software support problems). Development of modern appli-
cations is complicated by the need for systematic and rig-
orous integration of fault tolerance measures. The paper
focuses on reuse of fault tolerance modelling. First, it in-
troduces the idea of general modelling templates, reflecting
abstract views on system behaviour with respect to faults.
These templates are used during system detalisation (re-
finement) to capture the user’s view on system external be-
haviour. Secondly, it proposes to use a library of concrete
modelling patterns allowing the developers to systematically
integrate specific fault tolerance mechanisms (e.g. recovery
blocks, checkpoints, exception handling) into the models.
The proposed solutions are linked to the Event-B method
and demonstrated using a case study.
1. INTRODUCTION
Our society is becoming increasingly dependant on computer-
based systems. There is a class of such systems, called criti-
cal, that provide services for fulfilling essential aspects of our
life. Insufficient reliability of a critical system may result in
significant losses of time, money, resources, or, even, lives.
Critical systems have to be dependable [3], so that they
can be justifiably trusted to provide the required services.
Using formal methods is one of the solutions for ensuring
system dependability by fault prevention or/and fault re-
moval. Even though formal methods are not always used
in developing industrial systems, their use in development
of dependable systems is increasing and proven to be cost-
effective [15]. If such system is formally developed, its key
properties are ensured during the formal stage. However, it
is well-known that we cannot produce a perfect system with-
out a single fault, which functions in the perfect fault-free
environment, this is due to many reasons including changing
environmental conditions, hardware failures, and inevitable
mistakes during the development process. In order to keep
reliability at a sufficient level, we need to mitigate faults
during system execution time. This is exactly the target
of fault tolerance (FT): providing a required service in the
presence of faults.
There is a considerable amount of FT-related requirements
within any critical system project1. Conditions causing erro-
neous transitions, error detection and recovery mechanisms,
data and time redundancy requirements are all to be ad-
dressed during development of such systems. We believe
that fault tolerance must be formally and explicitly devel-
oped starting from the earlier engineering steps with the pur-
pose of improving requirements traceability, development
discipline and to allow the developers to evaluate the fault
tolerance decisions earlier in the development.
In this paper, we propose solutions for systematic integra-
tion of fault tolerance during the refinement-based formal
stage of software development in the Event-B method. Re-
finement provides a consistent way for stepwise development
during which we have a correct model of a system at each
step. The prevailing practice in system modelling is in fo-
cusing modeller’s attention on the functional part of system
behaviour, i.e. the normal one, with an (unsubstantiated)
assumption that no errors can arise. This often results in
difficulty with (or non-optimal) addition of the fault-tolerant
behaviour at the later steps. With the refinement process
and typically not accurate and evolving requirements, this
problem is exacerbated by the inherent principles of formal
system detalisation: in particular, by the inability to for-
mally extend the behaviour of the abstract models with the
new (e.g. abnormal) behaviour that was not anticipated.
There are several solutions, all of which modify the way
the formal refinement is defined. One of which is in formal
definition of partial refinement [11]. However, in our work
we would like to be practical: to use the existing methods
widely-used in practice and to minimize changes of the exist-
ing tool suites. More generally, we would like to encourage
early FT development by providing corresponding top- level
abstractions.
It is widely accepted that it is beneficial to support multiple
views on the model, so that each of the views can focus on a
particular concern of the model/system. This facilitates the
development by explicitly bounding the modeller into a spe-
1See, for example, our ongoing work within the ICT Deploy
project - http://www.deploy-project.eu/
cific context without cluttering the model (some examples of
this are multiple views provided by UML, or different views
on the model supported in AADL). We intend to exploit this
idea by developing an FT modelling approach, orthogonal
to the existing method and supported by the appropriate
extension of the existing tool chain.
Our proposal consists of several parts. We describe a mod-
elling approach to assisting development of the fault toler-
ance part of the models. We provide a set of abstractions for
system modelling from the FT point of view, which can be
further refined using basic templates. We are developing a
modelling environment for the FT view operating with such
abstractions and templates and orthogonal to the existing
Event-B model view. A formal link with Event-B is based
on our previous work on modal system modelling [6]. We
further investigate possible solutions for systematic Event-
B model transformations to support specific FT templates
with automatic refinement.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2
briefly introduces the Event-B method and the Rodin devel-
opment environment. Section 3 demonstrates the abstract
templates, defining general classes of the systems with re-
spect to their fault tolerance behaviour. Section 4 shows
how a fault tolerance view can be supported by Event-B
model transformation patterns. A case study is used in Sec-
tion 5 to illustrate our approach. Section 6 outlines the
existing work in the area.
2. EVENT-B
Event-B is a state-based formalism closely related to Classi-
cal B [1] and Action Systems [4]. The step-wise refinement
approach is the corner stone of the Event-B development
method. A combination of model elaboration, atomicity re-
finement and data refinement helps to formally transition
from high-level architectural models to very detailed, ex-
ecutable specifications ready for code generation. An ex-
tensive tool support makes Event-B especially attractive.
An integrated Eclipse-based development environment2 is
under active development now and well-supported. Impor-
tantly for us, it is open for extension using the Eclipse plug-
in mechanism. The main verification technique is theorem
proving and the development is supported by a collection of
powerful theorem provers while there is also a capable model
checker.
An Event-B model is defined by a tuple (c, s, P, v, I, RI , E)
where c and s are constants and sets known in the model;
v is a vector of model variables; P (c, s) is a collection of
axioms constraining c and s. I is a model invariant limiting
the possible states of v: I(c, s, v). The combination of P and
I should characterise a non-empty collection of suitable con-
stants, sets and model states: ∃c, s, v ·P (c, s)∧I(c, s, v). The
purpose of an invariant is to express model safety properties
(that is, unsafe states may not be reached). In Event-B an
invariant is also used to deduce model variable types. RI
is an initialisation action computing initial values for the
model variables; it is typically given in the form of a pred-
icate constraining next values of model variables without,
2The Rodin platform
http://www.event-b.org/platform.html
however, referring to previous values - RI(c, s, v
′). Finally,
E is a set of model events.
An event is a guarded command: H(c, s, v) → S(c, s, v, v′),
where H(c, s, v) is an event guard and S(c, s, v, v′) is a before-
after predicate. The general form of an event in Event-B
notation is
name = any p where
H(c, s, p, v)
then
S(c, s, p, v, v′)
end
where p is a vector of event parameters.
An event may fire as soon as the condition of its guard is
satisfied and no other event executes at the same time. In
case there is more than one enabled event at a certain state,
the demonic choice semantics is applied. The result of an
event execution is some new model state v′. The semantics
of an Event-B model is usually given in the form of proof se-
mantics, based on Dijkstra’s work on weakest precondition.
A collection of proof obligations is generated from the def-
inition of the model and these must be discharged in order
to demonstrate that the model is correct. For an abstract
model (a model that is not a refinement of another model)
two such proof obligations are the invariant satisfaction and
event feasibility. A new state produced by an event must
satisfy the model invariant:
I(c, s, v) ∧ P (c, s) ∧H(c, s, v) ∧ S(c, s, v, v′)⇒ I(c, s, v′)
An event must also be feasible, in a sense that an appropri-
ate new state v′ must exist for some given current state v:
I(c, s, v) ∧ P (c, s) ∧H(c, s, v)⇒ ∃v′ · S(c, s, v, v′)
There are also proof obligations to establish deadlock free-
ness, enabledness conditions and a collection of proof obliga-
tions for demonstrating Event-B forward simulation refine-
ment [14].
3. FAULT TOLERANCE
DETALISATION TEMPLATES
An FT view is a document developed alongside an Event-B
model. It describes the design of the fault tolerance features
in a compact and concise manner. It also offers simple detal-
isation rules that assist a user in constructing models with
a corresponding fault tolerance part. There is a set of rules
for formally checking the consistency of the FT view and its
Event-B model.
The FT view is treated as a special case of a mode diagram,
developed in our previous work on modelling modal systems;
so that the consistency conditions for fault tolerance are
borrowed from the mode conditions [6].
In his/her modelling activity the user is assisted with two/three
simple refinement templates.
3.1 Overview
The two basic concepts of the FT view are activity and er-
ror. An activity is an abstract description of a system be-
haviour. An error, followed by an error detection always
leads to switching from one activity to another. An error
originates in a normal activity and leads to switching to a
degraded activity or a recovery activity. Note that activity
attribution to the specific type is relative and depends on
the scope of discussion: what is a degraded mode activity in
respect to one activity may be a normal activity in respect
to another. It is important that a degraded activity is also
a normal activity with respect to any error originating from
it. In Fig. 1, activity A is a normal activity; there is an error
e1 leading to alternative activity B from which the system
could arrive at activity C upon an occurrence of another
error e2.
A B C
e1 e2
Figure 1: FT view basic concepts
There are certain restrictions to the ways FT diagram may
be drawn. For instance, it may not contain cycles formed
entirely from error transitions.
The building blocks of a diagram are primitives describing
the initiation of a degraded activity and a transition into a
recovery activity (Fig. 2). The principle distinction between
the two is that recovery activity is obliged to terminate and
pass control back to the activity from which the initiating
error originated.
A B A B
Figure 2: Degraded and recovery activities
Safe-stop is regarded as a special case of a degraded activity.
3.2 General Classes of Fault Tolerant Systems
Diagrams are built in a step-wise manner, starting from the
most primitive case and introducing details with a number
of predefined templates. The reason for a template-based
approach is to match the step-wise development method of
Event-B and avoid verification of FT diagrams since dia-
grams built in a step-wise manner are always well-formed.
There are just two possible initial diagrams, defining two
broad system classes. The first class does not have an un-
recoverable error: all errors are recoverable and, at a suffi-
ciently abstract level, there are no errors at all. In the other
case, there are errors that cannot be masked and system
necessarily transitions into a differing activity after an error
occurrence. What is considered to be an error is a design
choice: the same functionality may be implemented by ei-
ther system class. Fig. 3 illustrates the two possible initial
diagrams.
In the first diagram, the most abstract system is a normal
activity. Further detalisation of the diagram may introduce
N DN
Figure 3: Abstract classes of FT systems
only maskable errors. In the second diagram, in addition to
the normal activity there is an error leading to a degraded
mode activity. Both normal and degraded activities may
be explained in further details by introducing new maskable
errors. The error originally present in the initial diagram
may also be explained in the terms of a number of new
errors.
To assist in the construction of FT diagrams, two detalisa-
tion templates are offered. The first one is concerned with
detalisation of an error occurrence in a diagram. The idea
here is to replace an abstract depiction of an error with two
or more concrete errors. This process may be repeated as
many times as needed and the result is a whole family of
errors derived from a single abstract error.
A B A
B1
B2
e
e1
e2
A B A
B1
B2
e
e1
e2
Figure 4: First template
As shown in the diagram on Fig. 4, there are two versions
of this template. One for the case when an error leads to
a degraded activity and another when there is also a subse-
quent recovery. This distinction is due to the fact that an
obligation of successful recovery must be preserved during
detalisation.
The second template introduces a new error that was not
observed at a previous abstraction layer (Fig. 5). This error,
of course, must be masked and thus an error may only switch
into a recovery activity.
A A B
e
Figure 5: Second template
A diagram may be considered final once for each error con-
dition in a system requirements document, there is a corre-
sponding error arrow in the diagram.
3.3 Event-B Link
Our intention is to offer a modelling assistant environment
to Event-B developers. For the FT diagrams approach to be
truly useful, there need to be a formal relationship between
a diagram and an Event-B model establishing that a model
agrees with a diagram. Thus, an FT diagram alone would
be enough to grasp the design of fault-tolerance in a model.
The formalisation approach is based on a more general no-
tion of formal modal systems [10]. There is a study on link-
ing mode diagrams and Event-B [6] and some of the results
are reused here.
Activity is a general characterisation of a system behaviour.
To match this notion in terms of Event-B models, activities
are mapped into non-overlapping event groups. Likewise, an
error is mapped into a single Event-B event.
For a stronger notion of a diagram - model relationship, we
consider an FT view as a set of activities providing different
functionality under differing operating conditions. We use
the terms assumption to denote the different operating con-
ditions and guarantee to denote the functionality ensured
by the system under the corresponding assumption. With
assumption and guarantee of an activity being predicates ex-
pressed on the same variables as an Event-B machine, we are
able to impose restrictions on the way activities and errors
are mapped into model events and thus cross-check design
decisions in either part.
Formally, an activity is characterised by pair A/G where:
• A(v) is an assumption - a predicate over the current
system state;
• G(v, v′) is the guarantee, a relation over the current
and next states of the system; and
• vector v is the set of model variables.
It is required to show that the assumptions exhaust the in-
variant and thus cover all the safe system states:
I(v)⇒ A1 ∨A2 ∨ · · · ∨An (1)
Here I(v) is a model invariant characterising valid states of
v. One other important property of an activity is that it
is possible for some state transition to take place within an
activity. We do not care here to give a precise definition of
such transition, - this information would be later filled in
by an Event-B machine - it is only necessary to show that
there exists at least one such transition and thus activity
characterisation makes sense:
∃v, v′ · I(v) ∧A(v)⇒ G(v, v′) (2)
Thus, G can never be false everywhere while, under certain
circumstances, this would be allowed for A. Note that from
above it follows that an activity assumption is satisfiable:
∃v · A(v). It is required that no two activities may be run-
ning at the same time. This translates into demonstrating
that each activity has an assumption that does not overlap
with an assumption of any other activity:
I(v)⇐ A1(v)⊕ · · · ⊕An(v) (3)
In addition to activities, a diagram also includes two kind
of activity connectors: errors and recovery. Their purpose
is to define possible activity changes. We formalise the no-
tion of activity connectors by modelling possible transitions
between activities.
A system switches from one activity into another through
an activity transition that non-deterministically updates the
state of v in such a way that the assumption of the source
activity becomes false while assumption of the target activ-
ity becomes true. Let us consider two activities, i and j.
An activity transition is required to establish a new state
v′ such that ¬Ai(v
′) and Aj(v
′) while it is not under the
obligation to respect Gi(v, v
′).
It is required that all the activities are reachable. Although
we could give a formal test for this property, there is no
need to check it as long as a diagram is constructed using
the predefined development templates discussed above.
3.3.1 Detalisation Conditions
FT diagrams are built by incrementally adding new activi-
ties, errors and recoveries using the two development tem-
plates. There are certain constrains to applying develop-
ment templates. First, we should not allow a modeller to
arbitrarily change the activity assumption and guarantee
during detalisation. Second, in some cases of adding a new
activity we effectively ’split’ an abstract one and thus there
is a relationship between the attributes of the abstract and
concrete activities.
The first condition states that during detalisation the as-
sumption of an activity my be weakened while its guarantee
may be strengthened. For a discussion why it is like this see
[6].
A(v)/G(v, v′) ⊑ A′(u)/G′(u, u′)
iff
{
J(v, u) ∧A(v)⇒ A′(u)
J(v, u) ∧G′(u, u′)⇒ G(v, v′)
(4)
Here J(v, u) is a gluing invariant relating a concrete state u
to an abstract state v. The assumption and guarantee of a
refined activity are stated on the concrete state.
In a more general case, an activity is refined into two or
more concrete activities:
A(v)/G(v, v′) ⊑
A1(u)/G1(u, u
′)
A2(u)/G2(u, u
′)
,
iff
{
J(v, u) ∧A(v)⇒ A1(u) ∨A2(u)
J(v, u) ∧G1(u, u
′) ∨G2(u, u
′)⇒ G(v, v′)
(5)
With this rule new activities appear by splitting a fictitious
activity false/true. This activity can be refined into a copy
of itself and a new activity A(w)/G(w, w′).
After adding a new activity one has to connect it to the
rest of a diagram by placing a new activity transition: an
error or a recovery. A simple rule applies: removing new
activities and new activity transitions from a detalised di-
agram results in the original diagram, apart from possible
change in assumption and guarantee predicates. A more
general modal diagram defines a number of additional con-
straints on transitions that are not needed here due to very
restricted manner of a diagram evolution.
3.3.2 Reconciling Event-B and FT View Diagram
With the basic formal framework of activities in place, it is
possible to define a consistency condition for an FT view dia-
gram and Event-B machine. The core principle is seeing the
diagram as a source of further obligations for a machine. We
are not going to translate activities into Event-B or Event-B
into activities. Instead, we are going to add additional proof
obligations to a machine that establish the consistency with
a given FT diagram. Of course, it does not matter where
the proof obligations are added - we could flip this around
and prove that a machine is consistent with a diagram by
adding some theorems to diagrams. It is, however, more
natural to deal with additional constraints in a machine and
the intuition is that a simpler diagram should lead the devel-
opment of a machine. Although we do not discuss this case,
nothing prevents one from proving that the same machine
is consistent with more than one diagram.
The first step is to relate activities to machine elements. A
diagram is linked with an Event-B model by attributing a
list of Event-B model events to each activity:
A1/G1 7→ E1
A2/G2 7→ E2
. . .
An/Gn 7→ En
Event sets E1, . . . , En may overlap but should not be identi-
cal. The latter is due to the fact that two activities Ai/Gi 7→
E and Aj/Gj 7→ E are equivalent to a single activity Ai ∨
Ai/Gi ∧Gj 7→ E and thus there is no advantage in allowing
configurations where activities have identical event sets.
The result of mapping activities into event sets is that there
are now additional requirements to machine events: an event
related to some activity must respect the activity guarantee
provided the activity assumption holds. Execution cannot
progress if there is no suitable enabled event for an activity.
From the above the following conditions are derived.
All the events of an activity must satisfy the activity guar-
antee provided the assumption holds:
I(v) ∧A(v) ∧H(v) ∧R(v, v′)⇒ G(v, v′) (6)
The partitioning of the events into activities must be in
agreement with the event guards. When an event is en-
abled then the assumption of its activity must hold. Since
an event is potentially associated with multiple activities,
the disjunction of all the relevant assumptions must hold:
H(v)⇒ A1(v) ∨ · · · ∨Ak(v)
Ak+1(v) ∨ · · · ∨An(v)⇒ ¬H(v)
(7)
where A1, . . . , Ak are the assumptions of the activities con-
taining an event with guard H(v) and Ak+1, . . . , An are
those not containing the event.
4. FACILITATING FT VIEW
WITH EVENT-B SUPPORT
The FT view and detalisation templates are orthogonal to
Event-B model development. For more FT modelling sup-
port, diagrams can be coupled with a model transformation
mechanism. The essential entity of the mechanism is a sin-
gle model transformation - a pattern. A pattern takes an
input model and produces an output model which is a cor-
rect refinement. Such pattern introduces a comprehensible
detalisation into the model focusing on a particular aspect.
The refinement relation is to be formally established in ei-
ther an offline proof of transformation correctness, or left
to user as a number of proof obligations. We can clearly
see three main aspects to be addressed for a well-designed
pattern approach:
• applicability conditions that input model must satisfy
in order to be transformed;
• transformation itself; and
• formal proof of transformation correctness
By providing model transformations it is possible to reduce
the total number of proofs done by user and generally sim-
plify the whole development process. The basic idea for glu-
ing patterns with the FT view is to create a simple transfor-
mation pattern for each of FT detalisation templates. Thus,
when refining a FT view, a user automatically gets a refined
Event-B model which is consistent with the new FT view.
A reasonable part of necessary proofs may be carried out
without involving user which is a subject for further inves-
tigation.
The FT view is a structuring mechanism which encourages a
disciplined approach to modelling fault tolerance. Transfor-
mation patterns operate on a meta-model level and there-
fore are expressive in describing particular changes into the
model. It is feasible to create transformations which add
specific FT mechanisms. They may be domain-specific or
suitable for a wider application. Transformation mechanism
together with detalisation templates allow to create libraries
of patterns which can be extensively reused within formal
modelling community.
4.1 Library of Fault Tolerance Patterns
Any non-trivial development in the Event-B method is a
chain of refinements. Each refinement usually targets a sin-
gle aspect of a model that needs to be detailed and keeps
the rest fixed. It is obvious that such narrowed changes to
the model cannot be unique among all developments. The
modelling process might be significantly simplified by having
a mechanism of reuse of decisions made for another model.
The intuitive analogue of similar reuse in software engineer-
ing is design patterns which have had considerable effect on
engineering process.
The library of fault tolerance patterns might ease the mod-
elling process of new systems and provide a seamless way to
add fault tolerance to existing systems. Examples of fault
tolerance techniques which can be added to the model are:
exception handling, N-version programming, checkpoints,
recovery blocks, etc [3]. Each of these techniques can be
decomposed into a number of finer-grained transformations.
Such elementary patterns are semantically self-contained and
introduce a particular functionality into a model. They
might not represent specific fault tolerance techniques on
their own. However, by combining elementary patterns, a
modeller may get a wide variety of existing fault tolerance
techniques and effectively mix them to create more complex
recovery. Examples of such small elements are: creation of
replica, state save, voting mechanism, etc.
Fig. 6 shows a simple detalisation template for adding a
spare sensor activation. Activity is an abstract depiction of
a system normal execution, Stop is a state of system when
its operation is no longer possible. On this level of detal-
isation, it is not important what exactly constitutes each
of those activities. The input diagram essentially shows a
separation of system execution into its normal activity and
termination. We assume existence of a sensor within an in-
put model which can fail. An output model introduces a
maskable error recovery activity which fires when the ac-
tive sensor has failed. This recovery is obliged to return the
system to its normal operation or results in termination if
no spare sensors available. We can see several explicit re-
quirements to an input model: existence of a stop state, and
of a sensor with its spares. These requirements need to be
formally defined in applicability conditions of an underlying
transformation pattern.
Activity Activity
Switching to
spare sensor
Sensor failed
Sensor operation restored
Stop Stop
No spares available
Figure 6: Example template for adding a spare sen-
sor
Another example can be the checkpointing capability for
tackling transient faults. The template for the mechanism
(Fig. 7) adds two activities: taking a Checkpoint and making
a Rollback action. The checkpoint can be taken regularly
with an interval of time, or based on a certain condition on a
state of the normal activity. The underlying transformation
pattern can be composed of fine-grained elements mentioned
above: creation of variables replica and state save. Such
details lie on a lower level than the FT view diagram.
Activity Activity
Checkpoint
Rollback
Figure 7: Example template for introducing check-
points
Obviously, these examples are not tied to any particular
domain and can be applied to various developments.
4.2 Possible Implementations
We considered a number of possible transformational ap-
proaches to adding FT by refining Event-B models, and
drew a general picture of properties necessary for such mech-
anism. These properties are: usability, generality, and proof
support. Usability is an informal property telling how easy
it is to create and read transformations. Generality consists
of the language expressiveness, and how broad is the con-
text of applying transformations. Proof support is a formal
necessity for proving the correctness of a refinement step.
In [9], a transformational approach for Event-B is proposed
by the name of refinement patterns. A refinement pattern
is a generic model transformer which takes a higher level
abstract model as its input and produces a correct refined
model on output. The pattern is composed from finer-
grained model transformation rules. Each such rule is a
basic operation which can be performed upon a model, e.g.
addition of a variable or event to a model. The rule consists
exactly of three parts described above with the formal proof
of correctness relying on both offline proving and obligations
for user. There is a language for describing sequential, par-
allel, and conditional rule compositions. The mechanism re-
alises all three aspects we defined although there are certain
issues with usability which need to be tackled.
Another possible solution is to rely on the Eclipse Modelling
Framework (EMF) [5] and its support for meta-modelling.
There are currently two languages we are considering: Ep-
silon Transformation Language (ETL) and ATLAS Trans-
formation Language (ATL). ETL [12] is built on top of Ep-
silon Object Language which is an imperative programming
language operating over EMF models. ATL [2] is another,
more declarative, language also operating on EMF models.
Given an existing Event-B meta-model, we can use these
languages to transform Event-B models. Both languages
are general and provide usability and rich functionality nec-
essary for constructing sufficient transformations. But in or-
der to use it for automating refinements, we need to formally
connect it with Event-B by either making formal model of
a language and proving its correctness, or generating appro-
priate proof obligations for a particular transformation.
5. CASE STUDY
The example is a sluice with two doors connecting areas
with dramatically different pressures. The pressure differ-
ence makes it unsafe to open a door unless the pressure is
levelled between the areas connected by the door. The pur-
pose of the system is to adjust the pressure in the sluice area
and control the door locks to allow a user to get safely inside
or outside. Such system can be deployed, for example, on a
submarine to allow divers to get out while submerged.
The diagram in Figure 8 shows the system elements.
The system description is summarised in the following set
of requirements:
1. the system allows a user to get inside or outside by
Figure 8: Sluice doors system
levelling the pressure between the room and the desti-
nation area
2. the system has three locations - outside, sluice and
inside
3. the system has two doors - door1, connecting outside
and sluice, and door2, connecting sluice and inside;
4. there is a device to change the pressure in the sluice;
5. a door may be opened only if the pressures in the lo-
cations it connects are equalised;
6. at most one door is open at any moment;
7. the pressure can only be changed when the doors are
closed.
Requirements 1-4 characterise the system by stating its goal
and its major parts. The last three characterise the system
behaviour. More precisely, they are the safety properties of
the system.
Figure 9: The sequence of steps required to let a
sluice user get from inside to outside
Figure 9 shows the stages of the system operation that let a
user to get outside starting in the inside area. The shaded
rectangles denote a pressure level, high pressure area cor-
responds to a higher rectangle. The ”u” label marks the
current position of a system user. Initially, a user is inside
and the sluice pressure is levelled with the outside pressure.
Before the door connecting to the sluice is opened, the pres-
sure is decreased to level it with the inside pressure. Once
the door is open, the user moves in, the door is sealed again.
Finally, the sluice pressure is set to match the outside pres-
sure and the door leading may be safely opened.
Here we show how such system can be formally modelled
with the help of detalisation templates discussed in the pa-
per. All the Event-B models mentioned in this section were
modelled in the Rodin tool and proved to be correct. We
omit showing them in whole due to lack of space, and focus
mainly on the FT view of the system.
By choosing one of abstractions discussed in section 3.2, we
start with the most abstract view of a system behaviour by
splitting it into normal and degraded activities (Fig. 10).
A degraded activity represents a state when it is no longer
possible for a system to operate normally.
Normal Degraded
Figure 10: Sluice abstract FT diagram
Let us denote such separation by a variable normal ∈ BOOL
with normal and degraded activities having respective <as-
sumption, guarantee> pairs:
An/Gn : normal = TRUE / TRUE
Ad/Gd : normal = FALSE / normal
′ = FALSE
An Event-B model conforming to this FT view consists of
three events:
normal = when normal = TRUE then skip end
degraded = when normal = FALSE then skip end
error detected = when
normal = FALSE
then
normal := TRUE
end
The first two represent activities, and error detected is an
abstract depiction of an error detection mechanism which
transitions system into its degraded state:
An/Gn 7→ {normal, error detected}
Ad/Gd 7→ degraded
Consistency between the model and the view can be easily
established by showing that necessary conditions (1, 2, 3, 6,
7) trivially hold.
Now we refine the normal behaviour to meet the system
requirements stated above. First, we define variables repre-
senting physical phenomena:
v :
door1 ∈ BOOL
door2 ∈ BOOL
pressure ∈ {0, 1}
Next, we cover requirements 5 and 6 by the following invari-
ant statements:
I(c, v) :
error = FALSE ∧ door1 = TRUE
pressure = 0
error = FALSE ∧ door2 = TRUE
pressure = 1
error = FALSE ∧ door1 = door2
door1 = FALSE
The system evolution is described by the following events:
open1 and close1 control the first door, open2 and close2
control the second, pressure low and pressure high oper-
ate the pressure device. All of them refine an abstract event
normal. The guards and actions of these events are speci-
fied to meet the safety requirements 5, 6, and 7. This step
refines the normal behaviour of the system and does not in-
troduce any changes into the FT view at the current level
of abstraction.
Let us now refine the degraded activity into its more concrete
counterparts. By using the first template from section 3.2,
we split it into three possible activities from which there is
no return to normal operation (Fig. 11).
Normal One-way
Safe stop
Broken
Figure 11: Detalisation of the degraded activity
The Safe stop activity triggers when the system can termi-
nate with a state considered to be safe for a user and envi-
ronment. For example, the doors operation can be further
detalised by adding sensors which might fail. If a sensor of
a door fails while the door is opened, we consider this state
safe since the pressures on two sides of the sluice are con-
served. However, there is a chance of detecting an opened
position of a door which must be closed at the moment.
Obviously, it is a hazardous situation, possibly caused by
the environment conditions, which is not manageable by the
system. We define a Broken activity for such cases, which
could fire an alarm for instance.
Another interesting situation is when the system can still
provide its service but in a limited form. Imagine a user
is in a sluice during a change of pressure, and both door
sensors fail. The system is not fully operational anymore,
however it can still equalize pressure levels and unlock one
of the doors. After such activity, which we name One-way
here, the system execution safely stops.
We model these three new activities by a variable degraded ∈
{SAFESTOP, BROKEN, ONEWAY, NONE} and a num-
ber of events. The gluing invariant for this refinement is:
J(c, v) :
degraded 6= NONE ⇔ normal = FALSE
degraded = NONE ⇔ normal = TRUE
Assumption/guarantees and relation to Event-B events are
the following:
An/Gn : degraded = NONE / TRUE
Ass/Gss : degraded = SAFESTOP /
degraded′ = SAFESTOP
Abr/Gbr : degraded = BROKEN /
degraded′ = BROKEN
Aone/Gone : degraded = ONEWAY /
degraded′ = ONEWAY ∨
degraded′ = SAFESTOP
An/Gn 7→ open1, close1, open2, close2,
pressure high, pressure low,
oneway transition, safestop transition,
broken detection
Ass/Gss 7→ safestop
Abr/Gbr 7→ broken
Aone/Gone 7→ oneway, oneway to safestop
Once again, in order to show consistency with the Event-B
model, we need to prove that conditions (1, 2, 3, 6, 7) hold.
Since this FT view is a detalisation of a previous one, we
also need to show correspondence (4) and (5) for the normal
and degraded activities respectively.
The typical proof obligation generated by the FT view for
this case study would look like the following:
(degraded 6= NONE ⇔ normal = FALSE)∧
(degraded = NONE ⇔ normal = TRUE)∧
(normal = FALSE)⇒
(degraded = SAFESTOP ) ∨ (degraded = BROKEN)∨
(degraded = ONEWAY ∨ degraded = SAFESTOP )
(degraded 6= NONE ⇔ normal = FALSE)∧
(degraded = NONE ⇔ normal = TRUE)∧
((degraded′ = SAFESTOP ) ∨ (degraded′ = BROKEN)∨
(degraded′ = ONEWAY ∨ degraded′ = SAFESTOP ))⇒
normal′ = FALSE
It shows a refinement relation (5) between an abstract de-
graded activity and its three concrete detalisations. Ob-
viously, it holds. In more complex situations, guarantees
would contain relations among variables. However, we ex-
pect a significant part of proof obligations to be discharged
by existing provers within the Rodin platform.
As a simple example of reuse, now we introduce a notion
of a masked error into our model. By using our second
basic template from section 3.2, we add an abstract recovery
activity. Then we add a notion of sensors to our model. A
pressure room now has an active sensor along with a hot
spare. As soon as we detect a failure of a sensor, we activate
a spare one. When the last working sensor fails, the system
safely stops (Fig. 12).
We need to proceed with two model refinement steps to
achieve correspondence to the final FT view. It can be
Recovery
recoverable error
Normal One-way
Safe stop
Broken
Spare sensor
activation
Figure 12: Introducing a masked error and a sensor
failure tolerance
done manually as for previous refinements. Or the template
and the corresponding Event-B model transformation pat-
tern could be borrowed from conceptually existing library
as discussed in section 4.1.
6. RELATED WORK
There are a number of works targeting provision of develop-
ment facilities for FT in formal methods.
Ga¨rtner [7] gives a formal background and a classification of
transformational approaches to modelling FT. Three axes
are defined for classification:
• level of transformation - system or subsystem;
• object of transformation - program or specification;
• what is introduced by transformation - ”good” prop-
erties (FT components) or ”bad” properties (effects of
faults).
Many ideas surveyed in the paper are relevant to our work.
E.g., concept of provision of FT along with targeted masked
errors, checkpointing mechanism. Another interesting con-
cept discussed - abstract detector/corrector - can be mod-
elled using our approach with further detalisation into spe-
cific mechanisms. Attention is also paid to formal modelling
of graceful degradation in presence of faults.
One of such approaches is discussed in [11]. It presents a
model-based approach to modelling normal and fault-tolerant
parts of system behaviour separately, and formal founda-
tions of composition of the two. A concept of partial re-
finement is introduced and formally described to relate FT
behaviour to the whole system behaviour. In this approach,
a modeller is given two sets of requirements: for normal
part and for FT part with system properties being weak-
ened and faults added. The former is then called to be
partially refined by the latter, where the term “partially”
formally covers the weakened part of required properties.
With such approach applied to Event-B, augmentation of
existing refinement relation and the whole tool chain would
be inevitable.
In [13] authors introduce a general formal specification ap-
proach to be applied in development of dependable systems
with a layered architecture. The approach adds exception
handling mechanism to each layer of such systems and orga-
nizes communication between components within a hierar-
chical structure by means of exceptions. The exceptions gen-
erated by a component are treated as propagated at higher
layer. A propagated exception is evaluated by a component
as an acknowledgement of normal termination, an indicator
of recoverable error occurrence, or an indicator of unrecov-
erable error occurrence. The representation of exceptions is
used to introduce a model of a fault tolerant component in
B and the process of unfolding architectural layers by refine-
ment. Exception handling is a widely used mechanism and
bringing it into formal development is a reasonable way to
improve support for FT development. However, it is a sin-
gle mechanism, and projects would potentially benefit more
from modelling FT mechanisms closer to their domains.
Among transformation languages discussed in section 4.2,
there is also a design pattern approach to reuse for Event-B
[8]. The pattern is an Event-B machine which can be incor-
porated into the main development chain if they match each
other. The main advantage is a reduce of proofs: the pattern
is considered to be already modelled and its proof obligations
discharged before inserting into the target model. However,
it is not a transformational approach. One must explicitly
drive the development towards the matching pattern which
leads to certain applicability restrictions.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
While it is widely accepted that faults within complex sys-
tems are inevitable, providing reliable and systematically-
developed fault tolerance for such systems is crucial. In this
paper, we introduce an approach to facilitating formal mod-
elling of fault tolerance. A notion of a FT view, orthogonal
to model development, is proposed and integrated into the
Event-B method. By using the proposed FT view, we en-
courage the modellers to employ architectural abstractions
of fault-tolerant systems at early development phases, and to
refine them using the FT detalisation templates. We have
also briefly discussed our ongoing work on supporting the
FT templates with Event-B model transformation patterns.
We believe that the proposed templates and patterns to-
gether constitute a useful combination of abstractions for
disciplined and step-wise development of dependable sys-
tems and ensure an expressive link with the underlying for-
malism. Such coupling facilitates creation of libraries of
reusable development components supporting faster adop-
tion of widely accepted fault tolerance techniques for formal
system development.
Our future work will consist of:
• creating a flexible and open mechanism of model trans-
formation patterns,
• connecting it to the FT detalisation templates,
• developing a tool support (as a number of Rodin plug-
ins) supporting both parts of our approach to encour-
age reuse.
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